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Recent studies show that, over the past decade, judges and law-
yers have begun to cite to empirical studies in their work with increas-
ing regularity.  However, the use of empiricism is still not common in 
many areas of the law.  In this article, Tracey L. Meares draws on her 
background in criminal justice to highlight three major objections to 
the use of empiricism in criminal law and procedure:  (1) much of the 
empirical evidence used by courts is flawed and courts are not 
equipped to deal with complicated social scientific data; (2) the use of 
empiricism decreases public acceptance in the criminal justice system, 
which in turn, prevents an individual from internalizing legal rules 
(“less information is better”); and (3) empirical information is irrele-
vant to the normative goals of criminal law and procedure.  After 
fully analyzing these objections, the author presents various counter-
arguments that underscore the importance of using empiricism in the 
creation and interpretation of criminal law and procedure. 
Professor Meares dismisses the first critique as merely an objec-
tion to bad social science and argues for the use of critical review as 
one of the mechanisms by which courts could screen social science re-
search.  The author responds to the “less information is better” objec-
tion by attacking it on moral grounds and by demonstrating how the 
use of empirical evidence can lead to higher levels of legitimacy and 
to greater compliance with the law.  Finally, the author disposes of the 
third objection by arguing that the use of empirical studies makes 
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criminal justice decisions more transparent and allows us to hold de-
cision makers accountable for their actions. 
That empiricism is relevant to criminal law and criminal procedure 
is a point so obvious that it seems almost banal.  For example, the early 
history of empirical sociology is inextricably tied to the study of criminal 
behavior.1  One cannot study crime without a definition of the dependent 
variable, which law provides.  Moreover, for decades, empirical social 
science research has also been conducted in the criminal procedure 
arena.  Studies of plea bargaining,2 policing choices,3 and jury decision 
making4 have provided important descriptive accounts of key criminal 
justice system components. 
 
 1. Empiricism, particularly numerical empiricism, not merely for descriptive purposes, but for 
the purpose of making inferential connections in topic areas, dates back to the late 1800s.  Sociological 
methodology stems from Franklin Giddings’s work in his 1901 book making causal understanding the 
goal of sociological work.  See FRANKLIN H. GIDDINGS, INDUCTIVE SOCIOLOGY (1901).  Also during 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, another research approach, which emphasized field 
research and deemphasized Giddings-type causal theory, was prominent.  The best and last example of 
the survey tradition is probably ROBERT S. LYND & HELEN MERRELL LYND, MIDDLETOWN (1929).  
The Chicago School of Sociology was a hybrid of these two traditions, combining theory with survey-
type work.  ANDREW ABBOTT, DEPARTMENT & DISCIPLINE: CHICAGO SOCIOLOGY AT ONE 
HUNDRED 204–09 (1999).  The early-twentieth-century sociological work done on the social organiza-
tion of urban communities by Chicago School researchers Park, Burgess, Shaw, and McKay were very 
much concerned with crime and delinquency.  See Robert E. Park, The City, in THE CITY (Robert E. 
Park & Ernest W. Burgess eds., 1925); CLIFFORD R. SHAW & HENRY D. MCKAY, JUVENILE 
DELINQUENCY AND URBAN AREAS (rev. ed. 1969). 
 2. See, e.g., MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING: THE EXPERIENCE OF PROSECUTORS, 
JUDGES, AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS (1978) (empirical study of reasons why defense attorneys, prose-
cutors, and judges pursue plea bargains); PLEA-BARGAINING (William F. McDonald & James A. 
Cramer eds., 1980) (containing articles discussing studies of victim participation, prosecutorial bluff-
ing, judicial involvement, and elimination of plea bargaining); Ilene H. Nagel & Stephen J. Schulhofer, 
A Tale of Three Cities: An Empirical Study on Charging and Bargaining Practices Under the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 501 (1992) (discussing the prevalence of plea-bargaining as a 
means to circumvent the federal sentencing guidelines); Sarah N. Welling, Victim Participation in Plea 
Bargains, 65 WASH. U. L.Q. 301 (1987) (using empirical data to argue that victim participation in plea 
bargaining does not lead to fewer plea bargains). 
 3. See, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE, ARREST: THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY 
(Frank J. Remington ed., 1965) (results of comprehensive American Bar Foundation study of police 
behavior cited in Terry v. Ohio and Miranda v. Arizona); GEORGE L. KELLING ET AL., THE KANSAS 
CITY PREVENTIVE PATROL EXPERIMENT: A SUMMARY REPORT (1974) (showing no effect on crime 
resulting from changes in level and method of police patrolling); Lawrence W. Sherman & Richard A. 
Berk, The Specific Deterrent Effects of Arrest for Domestic Assault, 49 AM. SOC. REV. 261 (1984) (sug-
gesting that a domestic violence abuser is less likely to abuse after an arrest); The New York City Po-
lice Department’s “Stop & Frisk” Practices: A Report to the People of the State of New York from 
the Office of the Attorney General (Dec. 1, 1999), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/ 
reports/stop_ frisk/stop_frisk.html (a comprehensive empirical analysis of street stops in New York 
City). 
 4. See, e.g., HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966) (comprehen-
sive study of jury behavior and decision making); GARY LAFREE, Jurors’ Responses to Victims’ Behav-
ior in Rape Trials, in RAPE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF SEXUAL 
ASSAULT 200–33 (1989) (finding that character evidence against the victim and race of the victim in-
fluence jurors’ determinations of consent and guilt in rape trials); William J. Bowers et al., Death Sen-
tencing in Black and White: An Empirical Analysis of the Role of Jurors’ Race and Jury Racial Compo-
sition, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 171 (2001) (discussing effects of racial composition on jury deliberation 
and sentencing outcomes in capital cases). 
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Although descriptive accounts of criminal justice system phenom-
ena are relevant to criminal law and criminal procedure, such research is 
not necessarily critical to the normative enterprise of creating and inter-
preting criminal law and procedure.  Consider a few of the many tough 
questions in this area:  What does “probable cause” mean?; What does 
“beyond a reasonable doubt” mean?; Do Miranda warnings effectively 
protect the right to remain silent embodied in the Fifth Amendment to 
the Constitution?  While it is quite easy to imagine the ways in which 
empiricism can help us to evaluate the consequences of the normative 
choices we make when answering these questions, it is a more difficult 
task to imagine how empiricism might guide what we choose in the first 
place.  Is empiricism at all important to our normative choices?  While 
there are some who believe that empiricism is irrelevant to the construc-
tion of rules in the criminal law and procedure arena, I believe empiri-
cism plainly is relevant.  Here, I will lay a foundation for the use of em-
piricism in the interpretation, indeed, the creation of criminal law and 
procedure by reviewing and then answering three objections to the use of 
empiricism.  Through answering these objections, I hope to clear a path 
for social science tools in an area of law in which their use should be 
natural. 
I. OBJECTION ONE: QUALITY AND COMPETENCE 
Over the last few decades, numerous scholars have taken up the 
challenge of justifying the use of empiricism in law as a general matter.5  
An examination of the case law demonstrates some success.  Schauer and 
Wise’s recent study of the citation of nonlegal sources by judges and law-
yers indicates a sharp increase in such citations since 1990.6  Yet, the 
penetration of the social science into legal arenas still seems shallow after 
 
 5. See, e.g., Samuel M. Fahr, Why Lawyers Are Dissatisfied with the Social Sciences, 1 
WASHBURN L.J. 161 (1961) (discussing how social science can be valuable in the legal process); David 
L. Faigman, To Have and Have Not: Assessing the Value of Social Science to the Law as Science and 
Policy, 38 EMORY L.J. 1005 (1989) (suggesting a framework for the use of social science evidence in 
the legal system); Victor G. Rosenblum, A Place for Social Science Along the Judiciary’s Constitutional 
Law Frontier, 66 NW. U. L. REV. 455, 479 (1971) (urging use of social sciences “when the courts them-
selves formulate or invoke propositions or norms conditioned upon knowledge within the competence 
of the social sciences”); Peter W. Sperlich, Social Science Evidence and the Courts: Reaching Beyond 
the Adversary Process, 63 JUDICATURE 280 (1980) (advocating use of social science evidence to im-
prove fact-finding and to provide “social facts”); Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Authority: 
Obtaining, Evaluating, and Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 478 (1986) (ar-
guing that “social science research, when used to create a legal rule, is more analogous to ‘law’ than to 
‘fact,’ and hence should be treated much as courts treat legal precedent”). 
 6. See Frederick Schauer & Virginia J. Wise, Legal Positivism as Legal Information, 82 
CORNELL L. REV. 1080, 1108–10 (1997) (Schauer and Wise only do a preliminary study of citations to 
nonlegal sources in Supreme Court decisions, and note a marked increase since 1990); see also Paul S. 
Appelbaum, The Empirical Jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court, 13 AM. J.L. & MED. 335, 
335 (1987) (arguing that the Supreme Court “has increasingly relied upon data-based arguments”). 
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all of these years of arguing about it.7  The reasons for the reluctance of 
lawyers, judges, and others to embrace more empiricism, even when the 
adopted legal standards seem to make such an embrace inevitable, are 
numerous and complex.  A primary objection that has been lobbed 
against greater use of social science in legal decision making for decades 
actually has two parts.  Part one is that empirical evidence typically of-
fered to the courts to help them answer tough normative criminal law 
and procedure questions is flawed and therefore not helpful.  Part two is 
that courts are not capable of dealing with complicated, and sometimes 
conflicting, social science data.  Judges are not trained to assess empirical 
studies, and so they may unwittingly create bad decisions.8 
It is true that not all work relevant to the enterprise of interpreting 
law in the criminal justice arena is good social science,9 but that is not an 
 
 7. See Michael Dorf, Foreword: The Limits of Socratic Deliberation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 4 
(1998) (arguing in part that greater reliance on empirical and policy analysis will help ameliorate the 
contemporary limitations of common-law gradualism); David L. Faigman, Normative Constitutional 
Fact-Finding: Exploring the Empirical Component of Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 
541 (1991) (urging greater use of empiricism in constitutional decision making); Richard Posner, 
Against Constitutional Theory, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1998) (calling for more empiricism in constitu-
tional decision making). 
 8. For citations relevant to both parts of this objection, see Samuel M. Fahr & Ralph H. Oje-
mann, The Use of Social and Behavioral Science Knowledge in Law, 48 IOWA L. REV. 59 (1962) (sug-
gesting that prior misuse and misinterpretation contribute to hesitance by lawyers and judges to utilize 
social science evidence); Andrew Greeley, Debunking the Role of Social Scientists in Court, 7 HUM. 
RTS. 34, 50 (1978) (arguing the law, especially in the area of civil rights, should not reply on social sci-
ence evidence); Philip R. Lochner, Some Limits on the Application of Social Science Research in the 
Legal Process, 1973 LAW & SOC. Q. 815 (1973) (listing limitations that contribute to lack of influence 
of social science evidence in courts, including inexperience and ignorance by lawyers and judges, and 
inconsistency and uncertainty of the evidence); David M. O’Brien, The Seduction of the Judiciary: So-
cial Science and the Courts, 64 JUDICATURE 8 (1980) (questioning whether judges have the ability and 
resources necessary to distinguish between good and bad social science evidence); Michael Rustad & 
Thomas Koenig, The Supreme Court and Junk Social Science: Selective Distortion in Amicus Briefs, 72 
N.C. L. REV. 91 (1993) (describing how partisan organizations distort social science evidence in amicus 
curiae briefs and questioning whether Supreme Court Justices have the ability to independently evalu-
ate the validity of such evidence). 
 9. Perhaps the most famous example of questionable social science being relied on by the 
courts is Kenneth Clark’s “doll study,” cited by Chief Justice Warren in footnote eleven to Brown v. 
Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).  Both the methods and the conclusions of Clark’s study 
have been criticized in the years since Brown.  See, e.g., ROY L. BROOKS, INTEGRATION OR 
SEPARATION? 18–24 (1996) (questioning the methodology employed in the Clark study); Sara Law-
rence Lightfoot, Families as Educators: The Forgotten People of Brown, in SHADES OF BROWN: NEW 
PERSPECTIVES ON SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 3, 5–8 (Derek Bell ed., 1980) (arguing that oversimplifi-
cation renders Clark’s study incapable of capturing the actual complexity of classroom interaction 
among children); Edmond Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 150, 161–65 (1955) (suggesting that 
the methods used “tricked” the children involved and questioning the conclusions drawn from the re-
sponses); Phyllis A. Katz & Sue Rosenberg Zalk, Doll Preferences: An Index of Racial Attitudes?, 66 J. 
EDUC. PSYCHOL. 663 (1974) (reproducing the “doll study” and finding no clear-cut preference for 
white dolls); Ernest Van den Haag, Social Science Testimony in the Desegregation Cases—A Reply to 
Professor Kenneth Clark, 6 VILL. L. REV. 69, 69 (1960) (characterizing Clark’s study as “pseudo-
scientific”); Mark G. Yudof, School Desegregation: Legal Realism, Reasoned Elaboration, and Social 
Science Research in the Supreme Court, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1978, at 57, 70 (asserting 
that “virtually everyone who has examined the question” now recognizes that “[t]he proffered evi-
dence was methodologically unsound”).  For general reviews of post-Brown studies relating self-
esteem and school segregation, see Edgar G. Epps, The Impact of School Desegregation on the Self-
Evaluation and Achievement Orientation of Minority Children, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 
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objection to integrating social science with criminal justice decisions.  In-
stead, this critique is simply an objection to bad social science.  Admit-
tedly, concerns about the quality of social science research would have 
more traction if judges were incapable of discerning good from bad re-
search.  Judges and lawyers, for the most part, are not trained to assess 
social science evidence.  But the record does not point clearly to com-
plete incapacity.  There are examples that go both ways.  The Supreme 
Court has quite famously misanalyzed empirical jury study research con-
cerning the relationship between the quality of deliberation and jury 
size.10  Yet, there are numerous cases in which the Supreme Court and 
lower courts have indicated facility with even complex statistical re-
search.  A prominent example is the lower court’s assessment of a statis-
tical study assessing racial difference in the imposition of the death pen-
alty in Georgia in the McCleskey line of cases.11 
Whether or not judges currently are able to handle social science re-
search with expert ease, judges increasingly have suggested in opinions 
that they would like to see empirical work that is relevant to the issues 
presented to them—especially in the criminal procedure area.12  This im-
portant development is natural and foreseeable.  Modern criminal pro-
cedure emerged in a legal culture shaped by American realism and has 
been driven by empirical and pragmatic concerns about police practices, 
police-civilian encounters, crime prevention and detection, and civil lib-
erties.  Concern about these issues has led to a “balancing-of-interests” 
analysis that is the hallmark of deciding Fourth Amendment cases, and 
Fifth and Sixth Amendment cases as well.13 
Balancing analyses lend themselves to assessment of empirical re-
search.  The Supreme Court, in deploying such analyses, often makes 
empirical statements.  The Court strikes down rules of criminal proce-
 
1978, at 57, 75 (reviewing studies conducted after Brown and concluding that “there is no need to as-
sume that blacks suffer from low self-esteem or low aspirations, whether they attend segregated or 
desegregated schools”); Nancy H. St. John, The Effects of School Desegregation on Children: A New 
Look at the Research Evidence, in RACE AND SCHOOLING IN THE CITY 84, 90–92 (Adam Yarmolinsky 
et al., eds., 1981) (asserting all children will benefit from more integrated schools, but stressing the 
need for more long term studies to identify conditions necessary for successful integration). 
 10. See Bernard Grofman, The Slippery Slope: Jury Size and Jury Verdict Requirements—Legal and 
Social Science Approaches, LAW & POL’Y Q. 285 (1980) (arguing against the use of social science research 
in jury size cases because the Supreme Court is unable to use the research well); Paul Lermack, No Right 
Number? Social Science Research and the Jury-Size Case S, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 951 (1979) (same). 
 11. While the lower courts and the Supreme Court ultimately decided not to rely on the studies, see 
infra text accompanying notes 41–49, the lower court in particular clearly demonstrated the capacity to 
assess the research.  See McCleskey v. Kemp, 580 F. Supp. 338, 350–80 (N.D. Ga. 1994). 
 12. Recently, the Court has made much of the fact that decisions in two separate cases could 
depend on answers to empirical questions which were not currently available.  Wardlow v. Illinois, 528 
U.S. 119, 124–25 (1984); Martinez v. Court of Appeal of Calif., 528 U.S. 152, 163–66 (2000) (Breyer, J., 
concurring). 
 13. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943 
(1987) (discussing the prevalence of balancing in constitutional jurisprudence generally); Tracey L. 
Meares & Bernard E. Harcourt, Foreword: Transparent Adjudication and Social Science Research in 
Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 733, 736–40 (2000) (discussing bal-
ancing in criminal procedure). 
MEARES.DOC 2/20/2003  10:44 AM 
856 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2002 
dure because they “fail to protect privacy . . . and impede effective law 
enforcement.”14  The Court upholds other rules because they embody a 
“carefully crafted balance designed to fully protect both the defendant’s 
and society’s interests.”15  These statements, while obviously empirical, 
are made by the Court with absolutely no attempt to assess relevant em-
pirical evidence.  Yet, the empirical foundation of these statements ap-
pears to be intended by the Court to lend authority to the decisions.  It is 
likely that these kinds of decisions actually would be more authorita-
tive—at least they would be more credible and legitimate16—if the Court 
relied on empirical research to back up empirical statements. 
Still, the fact that empiricism could be useful and even produce 
great benefits in criminal justice decision making does not fully answer 
the quality and competence critics.  To make my argument, I have as-
sumed that there is at least some well done and relevant work to be util-
ized, but even this claim requires decision makers to distinguish the well 
done and useful work from that which is poorly done and less relevant. 
A set of guidelines and a group of litigants more eager about em-
piricism could helpfully test the unstated empirical assumptions of those 
who argue that courts are incapable of utilizing social science to a greater 
extent than they currently do.  In the article that originated the concept 
of courts relying upon social authority, John Monahan and Laurens 
Walker offer a set of guidelines for courts to use to assess social science 
research.17  Monahan and Walker point to critical review as a mechanism 
by which courts could evaluate social science research, and they discuss 
methods by which courts could assess the validity and generalizability of 
social science findings—including the question of research sponsorship.18  
Monahan and Walker point out, moreover, that courts are unlikely to 
undertake these evaluations by themselves and on their own initiative.  
The authors suggest instead that the adversarial process itself will ad-
dress some concerns about the ability of courts to adequately appraise 
social science research.19 
Once courts, and the Supreme Court in particular, more forthrightly 
indicate an interest in social science relevant to criminal procedure ques-
tions, litigating parties will be quick to make arguments regarding the 
strengths and weaknesses of empirical research.20  It also follows from my 
 
 14. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 576 (1991); see also Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 237 
(1983) (rejecting Aguilar-Spinelli because it “cannot avoid seriously impeding the task of law enforce-
ment”); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 431 (1976) (“[A] constitutional rule permitting felony 
arrests only with a warrant or in exigent circumstances could severely hamper effective law enforce-
ment.”). 
 15. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 433 n.4 (1986). 
 16. Meares & Harcourt, supra note 13. 
 17. See Walker & Monahan, supra note 5, at 498–508. 
 18. See id. at 499–507. 
 19. See id. at 512. 
 20. See Dorf, supra note 7, at 56 (claiming that parties and amici will follow the lead of the Court 
if it begins to rely to a greater extent on policy and empirical arguments). 
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argument here that social scientists, and the professional organizations to 
which they belong, should be more involved in writing amicus briefs on 
issues within their competence, which would further add to the strength 
and validity of social science research presented to the Court.21  The basic 
point is that if perceived weakness of research is a primary block to the 
greater use of social science in adjudication of normative criminal justice 
questions, then there is an obvious strategy to adopt to clear this obstruc-
tion.  The nature of the quality and competence objection is not against 
empiricism per se; rather, it is grounded in pessimism about the likeli-
hood of creating optimum conditions for the use of this evidence.  As 
conditions change—as courts become more receptive and lawyers better 
trained, etc.—this objection must fall away.  Or, the form of the objection 
must change. 
II. OBJECTION TWO: LESS (EMPIRICAL) KNOWLEDGE IS BETTER 
While the previous objection to the greater use of empiricism in 
criminal law and procedure is tied to the potential weakness of research 
and a perceived inability of decision makers to detect critical defects, one 
could lodge objections to linking empiricism to normative criminal jus-
tice questions even after assuming both that the research to be relied 
upon by courts meets the standards of relevant academic communities 
and that the particular court is capable of discerning its relevance.  One 
objection of this kind is related to the incompatibility with long-held 
conventions of the criminal legal process of the idiom of quantification to 
which empirical approaches often lead.  That is, some argue that reliance 
on empirical evidence (I use this term in a very general sense) corrupts 
decision making in the criminal law arena in ways that undermine how 
we typically conceptualize the proper operation of the criminal justice 
system.  While the legal scholars who have explored this argument have 
focused their attention primarily on the relationship between rules of 
evidence and probabilistic decision making,22 I will demonstrate that the 
distrust of quantification displayed in this research can be abstracted 
from this context. 
In an attempt to explain the court’s rejection of probabilistic evi-
dence in the famous “Blue Bus” case,23 Professor Charles Nesson has 
 
 21. See James R. Acker, Social Science in Supreme Court Criminal Cases and Briefs: The Actual 
and Potential Contribution of Social Scientists as Amici Curiae, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 25, 42 (1990). 
 22. See, e.g., Charles R. Nesson, Reasonable Doubt and Permissive Inferences: The Value of 
Complexity, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1187 (1979) [hereinafter Nesson, Permissive Inferences] (explaining 
that quantification of errors in criminal adjudication may undermine public respect for trial verdicts 
rendering them illegitimate); Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Le-
gal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329 (1971) (arguing that the utility of mathematical methods in the 
legal process, even if leading to greater accuracy, conflicts with other important values in the legal 
process). 
 23. The “Blue Bus” case is a famous hypothetical in evidence that is based on Smith v. Rapid 
Transit, Inc., 58 N.E.2d 754 (Mass. 1945).  The hypothetical assumes an accident between a person 
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claimed that the aim of the fact-finding process in a criminal trial is not 
simply to establish with a high probability that an event occurred; rather, 
it is to generate acceptable verdicts by ensuring that the verdict becomes 
a statement about past events.24  For some purposes, perception may be 
more important than reality; thus, verdicts that represent conclusions 
that certain sets of facts occurred at a high level of probability may not 
be acceptable verdicts.25  In one illustration of this thesis, Nesson offers 
as an example a case involving twenty-five prisoners who are in an en-
closed prison yard.26  Twenty-four of the prisoners collaborate in killing a 
prison guard, while one hides and is not involved.  If we know nothing 
else about the prisoners, we can be confident that if we select any one of 
the twenty-five prisoners at random, there is a ninety-six percent  chance 
that the prisoner selected participated in the murder.  In fact, we could 
go further.  If “beyond a reasonable doubt” were defined specifically at a 
ninety-five percent probability of guilt, it is possible, relying only upon 
naked statistical evidence, to convict all twenty-five prisoners, while be-
ing certain that one prisoner is innocent of the crime. 
Nesson argues that the criminal justice system seeks to produce “au-
thoritative finality” of judgments to encourage public deference to jury 
verdicts.27  This deference is critical because it is this deference that pro-
duces compliance with legal rules through internalization of them.28  Nes-
son explains that people who conform their conduct to an internalized 
code are “upright and law-abiding citizens,” while people who act on the 
basis of risk calculations without internalizing the guilt of breaking rules 
are probably criminals.29  Nesson concludes that deterrence to judgments 
is promoted by ensuring that decision makers rely on such a wide range 
of information in the context of secret deliberations that the public is un-
aware of precisely on what basis a verdict is reached. 
This argument depends on the idea that complexity and hidden de-
cision-making processes force the public as outsiders to defer because, as 
outsiders, we are unable to criticize any particular judgment with speci-
ficity and acuity.  The problem with the prisoner hypothetical, then, is 
the clarity with which the bare statistical case presents itself.  There are 
no ambiguities or complexities.  There is simply a naked bet that any in-
 
driving down a dark two-lane road on which an oncoming bus is traveling.  The bus is speeding down 
the center lane of the road.  The driver sees that the oncoming vehicle is a bus, but he cannot identify 
it.  The car driver swerves to miss and hits a tree, and the bus speeds by without stopping.  The injured 
car driver later sues the Blue Bus Company on the basis of the fact that the company owns and oper-
ates eighty percent of the buses that run on the road where the accident occurred.  The question is 
whether the plaintiff can win.  See Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event?  On Judicial Proof and 
the Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1357, 1378–79 (1985) [hereinafter Nesson, Acceptabil-
ity of Verdicts] (describing the hypothetical). 
 24. Nesson, Acceptability of Verdicts, supra note 23, at 1359. 
 25. Id. at 1378. 
 26. See Nesson, Permissive Inferences, supra note 22, at 1192–99. 
 27. See Nesson, Acceptability of Verdicts, supra note 23, at 1359. 
 28. See id. at 1360–61. 
 29. Id. at 1362. 
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dividual, whether an insider on the jury or not, can make that any one of 
the twenty-five prisoners committed the crime at a ninety-six percentt 
probability.  In the prisoner case, all are aware—painfully aware—of the 
precise risk of convicting an innocent man, and this explicit quantifica-
tion is inconsistent with a fuzzier, ambiguous definition of beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, which Professor Nesson states is necessary in order for 
decision makers to achieve consensus about any particular judgment of 
criminal guilt and to thereby induce the public to defer to this judg-
ment.30 
At base, the argument is simply this:  we may compromise truth and 
accuracy for less knowledge of the inner workings of system machinery 
in order to enhance the effectiveness of the system.  This is an argument 
about institutional costs, not moral ones.  Importantly, it is an argument 
about preservation of the existing system through a trade-off of accuracy 
for legitimacy, where legitimacy is defined as public acceptance. 
That there may be a potential trade-off between accuracy and le-
gitimacy, broadly defined, in the administration of criminal justice is not 
a new idea.  Constitutional guarantees of due process presuppose pre-
cisely the kind of trade-off that is implicit in Professor Nesson’s example.  
We understand that to protect a certain vision of due process in the 
American criminal justice system, we will likely get less “accuracy” in 
certain cases.  That is, we may very well be willing to tolerate more slack 
in our ability to separate the guilty from the innocent in order to pro-
mote individual liberty, and we understand that this trade-off may well 
compromise the pursuit of crime control.31  Some might argue that 
heightened constitutional requirements, such as the beyond a reasonable 
doubt standard, represent a preference for more accuracy rather than 
less in the criminal justice system.  In a sense that is right—but only with 
respect to one type of error.  By insisting on a high burden of proof and 
other constitutional guarantees that favor the defendant, we achieve 
greater accuracy in that we are less likely to convict innocent criminal de-
fendants.  However, these same rules promote less accuracy in that the 
rules increase the likelihood that criminal defendants who are guilty will 
be acquitted.  That we choose rules that result in a high number of cases 
in this latter category of error compared to the number of cases in the 
first category is the price of written constitutional imperatives to which 
we cleave for moral reasons (more on this below), but also because of a 
 
 30. In making this point, Professor Nesson echoes the opinion of the Court in In re Winship, 397 
U.S. 358 (1970).  In discussing the importance of the reasonable doubt standard, the Court stated “[i]t is 
critical that the moral force of criminal law not be diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in 
doubt whether innocent men are being condemned.”  Id. at 364. 
 31. Due process guarantees do make it harder for government agents to identify, charge, prose-
cute, and punish criminal offenders.  See generally Herbert L. Packer, Two Models of the Criminal 
Process, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 113–15 (1964).  Perhaps this is a cost of crime control in the way that 
Packer describes it.  Professor Nesson argues, and I agree, that there is a vision of effective law en-
forcement that depends on public deference to legitimate authorities which is not inconsistent with the 
provision of more due process guarantees.  To the contrary, it is entirely consistent with it. 
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sense that they work as an institutional matter to achieve the stated goals 
of the criminal justice system, including crime control.32 
It is critical to see that Nesson’s argument about ideal institutional 
design is a thoroughgoing empirical claim.  His claim is that people will 
not accept criminal judgments as long they are not fully aware of how the 
decision makers who impose such judgments came to these conclusions 
and of the error rates in these judgments across time.33  This might be 
true, or it might not.34  Whatever the empirical reality, Nesson’s argu-
ment against transparency in the criminal justice system presupposes the 
possibility that we should choose to enhance the power of the law’s sub-
stantive message by ignoring real evidence of systemic problems, because 
we may learn that people are more likely to defer to the power of the law 
when they are not forced to confront evidence of these problems. 
Even if one accepts Nesson’s premise that concealing empirical con-
tingency or inaccuracy in the administration of criminal law helps to up-
hold the legitimacy of law, one could easily reject this premise on norma-
tive grounds.  One could argue that it is simply never acceptable to 
achieve legitimacy by ignoring facts.  This is the conclusion that re-
searchers Saks and Kidd reached in their searing criticism of Laurence 
Tribe’s work cited above.35  Or, one could take a more nuanced position 
and argue that the decision to promote legitimacy of legal processes by 
suppressing empirical information is contingent upon the intrinsic moral 
worth of the institutions that one is legitimating.  While many might 
agree that Nesson’s arguments have power in the example on which he 
relies—assessment of reasonable doubt—there are contexts that test the 
assumptions that underlie his argument.  The death penalty and the rules 
the Supreme Court has adopted to govern the constitutional imposition 
of these sentences test the assumptions that Nesson makes on moral 
grounds.  In any event, whether or not one agrees or disagrees with Nes-
son on moral grounds, an evaluation of the rules surrounding the imple-
mentation of the death penalty clearly challenges the empirical premise 
of Nesson’s argument. 
One might describe the nature of the Supreme Court’s move from 
governance of death sentences through the scheme set out in Furman v. 
Georgia36 to the scheme outlined in Lockett v. Ohio37 as a deference-
 
 32. Compare the discussion of the relative frequency of these two types of errors in In re Winship, 
397 U.S. at 371–72 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 33. Put another way, people will eat sausage as long as they do not really know how it is made. 
 34. For an empirical study of the acceptability of knowledge and errors by juries, see Robert J. 
MacCoun & Tom R. Tyler, The Basis of Citizens’ Perceptions of the Criminal Jury: Procedural Fair-
ness, Accuracy, and Efficiency, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 333, 350 (1988) (testing Nesson’s thesis that 
explicit knowledge of error trade-offs in legal fact-finding can lead to erosion of the system’s legiti-
macy in the eyes of the public and finding strong support for jury system despite knowledge of rela-
tively frequent error in verdicts). 
 35. Michael J. Saks & Robert F. Kidd, Human Information Processing and Adjudication: Trial by 
Heuristics, 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 123 (1981). 
 36. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
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encouraging move according to the terms of Professor Nesson’s theory.38  
Under Furman, the constitutionality of a death sentence depended upon 
whether an outside observer could discern the basis by which some de-
fendants were selected to receive the penalty and some were not.  Justice 
Potter Stewart wrote in Furman that, “These death sentences are cruel 
and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightening is cruel and 
unusual.”39  In contrast, the regime ensconced by Lockett vaunts great 
discretion over transparency of decision making, as it allows decision 
makers to consider any factor offered by the defendant in mitigation of 
his death sentence.40  If Professor Nesson is correct, the Lockett scheme 
encourages the public to defer to the decision of juries to impose the 
death penalty precisely because it is not possible to verify exactly why 
they decided not to impose the sentence.  Less information is better. 
An example of the “less information is better” approach with re-
spect to the imposition of the death penalty can be found in McCleskey v. 
Kemp.41  In McCleskey, as is well known today, McCleskey challenged his 
death sentence by claiming that his death sentence was unconstitution-
ally imposed.42  To make his case, McCleskey offered a detailed empirical 
study indicating that in Georgia black defendants whose victims were 
white received the death penalty more often than white defendants 
whose victims were black.43  McCleskey argued that this study indicated 
that Georgia’s capital-sentencing regime violated the Fourteenth and 
Eighth Amendments.44  A majority of the Court disagreed.  The Court 
accepted the validity of the empirical study, but declined to accept the 
statistical proffer to support an inference that any of the decision makers 
in McCleskey’s case, or the state as a whole, acted with discriminatory 
purpose in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.45  The Court simi-
larly held that the empirical study did not support McCleskey’s claim 
that his death sentence was imposed in an arbitrary and capricious man-
ner in violation of the Eighth Amendment, even though McCleskey 
could point to other similarly situated defendants who did not receive the 
death penalty.46  Justice Powell, writing for the Court, stated that the na-
ture of discretion in the American criminal justice system allows the jury 
to extend mercy in some cases and not others based on the particularized 
circumstances of the crime and the defendant.47  An empirical study, the 
 
 37. 438 U.S. 586 (1978). 
 38. See Nesson, Permissive Inferences, supra note 22, at 1195 n.21 (offering with approval the 
jurisprudential evolution from Furman to Lockett as an example of the promotion of jury secrecy). 
 39. 408 U.S. at 309. 
 40. 438 U.S. at 604–05. 
 41. 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
 42. Id. at 286. 
 43. See id. at 311.  The now famous study is known as the Baldus study. 
 44. See id. 
 45. See id. at 312–13. 
 46. See id. 
 47. See id. at 311. 
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Court reasoned, cannot possibly capture the myriad factors relied upon 
by a jury deciding whether to impose the death penalty when “individual 
jurors bring to their deliberations qualities of human nature and varieties 
of human experience the range of which is unknown and perhaps un-
knowable.”48  There is a remarkable parallel between this sentence and 
those that immediately follow and the argument offered by Professor 
Nesson.  Preservation of the unknowable through the privileging of dis-
cretion is a good—or at least right—thing to do in the dispensing of 
criminal justice.49 
According to the McCleskey Court, discretion and all of the un-
knowables attendant to it are integral to the capacity of the American 
criminal justice system to provide individualized justice.50  Commitment 
to this principle means that even rigorous, generalizable empirical studies 
must give way to preserve our existing system because such studies cen-
ter on averages rather than particular cases.  And we must commit to this 
principle, claimed the McCleskey Court.51  The Court asserts that the 
consequences of failing to commit put the preservation of the existing 
system at serious risk.52  It is worth quoting the opinion extensively: 
Two additional concerns inform our decision in this case. . . .  
McCleskey’s claim, taken to its logical conclusion, throws into seri-
ous question the principles that underlie our entire criminal justice 
system.  The Eighth Amendment is not limited in application to 
capital punishment, but applies to all penalties. . . .  If we accepted 
McCleskey’s claim that racial bias had impermissibly tainted the 
capital sentencing decision, we could soon be faced with similar 
claims as to other types of penalty.  Moreover, the claim that his 
sentence rests on the irrelevant factor of race easily could be ex-
tended to apply to claims based on unexplained discrepancies that 
correlate to membership in other minority groups, and even to gen-
der.  Similarly, since McCleskey’s claim relates to the race of his vic-
tim, other claims could apply with equally logical force to statistical 
disparities that correlate with the race or sex of other actors in the 
criminal justice system, such as defense attorneys or judges.  Also, 
there is no logical reason that such a claim need be limited to racial 
or sexual bias.  If arbitrary and capricious punishment is the touch-
stone under the Eighth Amendment, such a claim could—at least in 
theory—be based upon any arbitrary variable, such as the defen-
dant’s facial characteristics, or the physical attractiveness of the de-
fendant or the victim, that some statistical study indicates may be 
influential in jury decision making.  As these examples illustrate, 
 
 48. See id. (quoting Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 503 (1972)). 
 49. Contrast this position to Justice Thomas’s, who has suggested that a mandatory death pen-
alty scheme would be more fair than the scheme promoted by Lockett.  See Graham v. Collins, 506 
U.S. 461, 485–87 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 50. 481 U.S. at 303–08. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 314–16. 
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there is no limiting principle to the type of challenge brought by 
McCleskey.  The Constitution does not require that a State elimi-
nate any demonstrable disparity that correlates with a potentially 
irrelevant factor in order to operate a criminal justice system that 
includes capital punishment.  As we  have stated specifically in the 
context of capital punishment, the Constitution does not “plac[e] 
totally unrealistic conditions on its use.”53 
In the text above, the Court states forthrightly the theoretical fear named 
by Professor Nesson.  The Court’s acceptance of McCleskey’s empirical 
argument would undermine the criminal justice system as we know it. 
But is the McCleskey Court correct?  Would reliance on the kind of 
statistical evidence proffered by McCleskey undermine the criminal jus-
tice system?  Or, to couch the question in Professor Nesson’s terms, 
would the public no longer accept verdicts produced by the system be-
cause the “errors,” read racial disparities, in the imposition of sentencing 
judgments were demonstrated in bold relief?  If so, and if preservation of 
the system as it exists is necessary to achieve compliance with the law, 
then must the Court reject a standard for judging infirmities that depends 
on such stark evidence for the institutional reasons Justice Powell offers?  
The last question is a decidedly normative one, but placed in pragmatic 
context, one can see how its answer depends on the resolution of Profes-
sor Nesson’s hypothesis—an assertedly empirical claim.  Obtaining a 
completely definitive answer to the hypothesis is extremely difficult, but 
there are intriguing data suggesting that at least part of the Nesson thesis 
is correct.  Acceptance of the death penalty appears to be related to the 
kind of information people have about error rates in the imposition of 
the penalty. 
While support for the death penalty has remained remarkably sta-
ble over time,54 there is evidence that as people become more aware 
about the way in which the penalty is implemented, support for capital 
punishment softens.  In March of 2000, a Gallup poll revealed the lowest 
level of support for the death penalty in twenty years—only fifty-eight 
percent of Gallup respondents registered support for the penalty in con-
trast to seventy-six percent of respondents registering support in 1994.55  
What accounts for the change?  The answer seems to be more informa-
tion—specifically more information about systemic errors.  While the 
downward trend appears to be connected to striking “case studies”—one 
Illinois death row inmate, Anthony Porter, was released two days before 
 
 53. Id. at 314–19. 
 54. See Samuel R. Gross & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Second Thoughts: Americans’ Views on the 
Death Penalty at the Turn of the Century, in THE MODERN MACHINERY OF DEATH: THE FUTURE OF 
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA (Stephen P. Garvey ed., 2001) (forthcoming 2002). 
 55. See Ken Armstrong & Steve Mills, Death Penalty Support Erodes; Many Back Life Term as 
an Alternative, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 7, 2000, at A1. 
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a scheduled execution56—it is apparent that the public’s willingness to 
consider distributional factors that can be uniquely informed by gener-
alizable empirical work is another reason for the downward trend in sup-
port.  A Chicago Tribune Poll conducted in February of 2000 demon-
strated that sixty-two percent of respondents favored restrictions on the 
death penalty in absence of certain restrictions and procedural protec-
tions.57  The poll data demonstrate forcefully that people care a great 
deal about who and how questions with respect to the death penalty—
issues at the heart of the McCleskey case.  The poll data, moreover, are 
suggestive of the Nesson thesis.  To the extent that the unknowables of 
discretion are revealed, the public is less willing to support a component 
of the criminal justice system to which they claim commitment—the 
death penalty.58 
There is, however, a second part of Nesson’s argument.  His claim is 
that without public acceptance of jury verdicts, there will not be wide-
spread internalization of legal rules.  To generalize, diminished support 
for the criminal justice system leads to diminished respect for the law and 
less compliance.  Of course, I do not begin to claim here that lower levels 
of support for the death penalty will lead to higher crime.  Nonetheless, 
more general data is available to assess Nesson’s second claim regarding 
the connection between system legitimacy and compliance with the law.  
Social psychologists have shown that voluntary compliance with the law 
is associated with perceptions of legitimacy of government and govern-
ment actors.  By pointing to normative bases for compliance rather than 
instrumental ones, these researchers have connected voluntary compli-
ance with the law to the fact that individuals believe the law is “just” or 
because they believe that the authority enforcing the law has the right to 
do so.59  These factors are considered normative because individuals re-
spond to them differently from the way they respond to rewards and 
punishments.  In contrast to the individual who complies with the law be-
cause she is responding to externally imposed punishments, the individ-
ual who complies for normative reasons does so because she feels an in-
ternal obligation.60  It is “[t]he suggest[ion] that citizens will voluntarily 
 
 56. See Gross & Ellsworth, supra note 54, at 35–36.  The emergence of publicized case studies of 
death penalty shortcomings creates a “new script” which has “made salient issues that used to be ig-
nored, and has changed some beliefs related to death penalty attitudes.”  Id. 
 57. See Armstrong & Mills, supra note 55, at A1. 
 58. Thus the data appear to confirm the so-called Marshall hypothesis.  Writing in Furman, Jus-
tice Thurgood Marshall argued that public supporters of the death penalty are largely uninformed 
about the effects and conditions of the actual imposition of the death penalty.  He then argued that as 
the public becomes more informed, support for the penalty will weaken so that only people who sup-
port death sentences out of a strong commitment to retributivism will continue to support it.  Furman 
v. Geosna, 408 U.S. 238, 360–69 (1971).  Both parts of this thesis have been empirically supported in 
systematic studies.  See Austin Sarat & Neil Vidmar, Public Opinion, the Death Penalty, and the Eighth 
Amendment: Testing the Marshall Hypothesis, 1976 WIS. L. REV. 171, 195 (confirming both aspects of 
the hypothesis). 
 59. See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 3–4 (1990). 
 60. See id. at 24. 
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act against their self-interest [that] is the key to the social value of nor-
mative influences.”61 
The research I have just mentioned confirms Professor Nesson’s 
hypothesis regarding the important connection between perceptions of 
government legitimacy and compliance with rules, but the primary con-
tribution of Nesson’s work was to demonstrate the importance of pre-
serving the unknowable black box nature of the system in order to sup-
port legitimacy.  We could make progress towards testing this 
contribution by demonstrating that more information about the distribu-
tion of sentences along racial lines will lead to less support for the crimi-
nal justice system generally in the way that more information about the 
distribution of the death penalty has apparently led to less support for 
capital sentences.  Importantly, less support for particular aspects of the 
criminal justice system does not necessarily lead to lower levels of per-
ceived system legitimacy.62 
Psychologist Tom Tyler has shown that people’s feelings of obliga-
tion to obey the police and the courts are generally quite high, even when 
those surveyed register widespread dissatisfaction with the law and with 
legal authorities.63  In fact, the work of social psychologists implies a con-
 
 61. Id. 
 62. Public opinion data on this point is intriguing.  Gallup has for several years asked respon-
dents about their level of confidence in selected institutions, including the criminal justice system.  
Similar percentages of whites and blacks register either a great deal of support, or quite a lot of  confi-
dence in the criminal justice system.  Blacks, however, register the most intense support.  See Fig. 2.  
Graph based on polls of confidence in the criminal justice system conducted by Gallup and found in 
the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research database. (3/93, 3/94, 4/95, 5/96, 7/97, and 7/98). 
























 63. See Tom R. Tyler, Citizen Discontent with Legal Procedures: A Social Science Perspective on 
Civil Procedure Reform, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 871, 871 (1997); Tom R. Tyler, Public Mistrust of the Law: 
A Political Perspective, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 847, 861 (1998) (finding that “dissatisfaction with the per-
formance of legal authorities does not lessen compliance with the law”); Tom R. Tyler, The Psychol-
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clusion that is at odds with the Nesson thesis.  To the extent that empiri-
cism improves the transparency of the system or enables individuals to 
better hold criminal justice system actors more accountable, legitimacy of 
the system may well increase.64 
Thus, if institutional concerns motivated the McCleskey Court to re-
ject the defendant’s empirical study, the Court may well have made the 
wrong choice.  The social psychological research reviewed above suggests 
that a commitment to the introduction of more, rather than less, empiri-
cal information into the process of assessing the implementation of pun-
ishment in the criminal justice system likely could lead to higher levels of 
perceived system legitimacy, which in turn could lead to more compli-
ance with legal rules and decisions. 
Of course, the McCleskey decision can be criticized on other 
grounds.  At the heart of the decision is a conclusion that a choice can be 
made to preserve the existing criminal justice system with reference to 
purely instrumental concerns.  Moral arguments that are independent of 
consequential concerns may compel a different conclusion. 
III. OBJECTION THREE: EMPIRICAL INFORMATION IS IRRELEVANT 
Issues of morality lead to the third objection to empiricism in crimi-
nal law and procedure.  Objectors in this camp can assume that the rele-
vant empiricism meets scientific standards and has something to do with 
the normative question being asked.  Nonetheless, these objectors claim 
that empiricism, however it is done, is irrelevant to the answers we look 
for in creating and interpreting criminal law and procedure.  They argue 
that because the values pursued in the criminal justice system are norma-
tive, they ought not be analyzed through social science methods.  George 
A. Fletcher, for example, has said that the “field of criminal theory 
should be thought of more as a humanist inquiry than as a social science.  
The questions that concern us are not empirical.”65  Professor Fletcher 
goes on to say that of course it is important to know how the criminal law 
works.  But he concludes that such descriptive enterprises are not at the 
heart of the theory, which is concerned with moral and political philoso-
phy.  Moral philosophy, he argues, is integral to issues of individual guilt 
and punishment, while political philosophy deals with collective blaming 
and state punishment.66 
 
ogy of Public Dissatisfaction with Government, in TRUST IN GOVERNMENT (Elizabeth Theiss-Morse & 
John Hibbing eds., 1995). 
 64. See Tracey L. Meares, Norms, Legitimacy and Law Enforcement, 79 OR. L. REV. 391, 408–15 
(2000) (drawing on social psychology and providing examples of “norm-based” criminal justice policy 
through which legitimacy could be enhanced through improvement in accountability and transpar-
ency). 
 65. George P. Fletcher, The Nature and Function of Criminal Theory, 88 CAL. L. REV. 687, 689 
(2000). 
 66. See id. at 690. 
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What would Fletcher have to say about the work of Paul H. Robin-
son and John M. Darley, who have investigated whether the moral intui-
tions of ordinary people match up with those of the criminal law theorists 
who penned the Model Penal Code (the Code) with respect to tough 
criminal law questions?  Robinson and Darley demonstrate fairly con-
vincing gaps between the Code and the subjects of the experiment.67  
While an empirically attentive criminal law scholar would say this work 
matters (or at least would attempt to explain the extent to which the 
study achieves its goal),68 one guesses that a scholar like George P. 
Fletcher would say this data is just irrelevant to the making of criminal 
law.69 
In a similar vein, some scholars who think about constitutional 
rights are skeptical of the role of empiricism in the articulation of rights.  
A great deal of this skepticism is born of the disagreement of these 
scholars with the balancing analysis that the Supreme Court has adopted 
in much of its constitutional jurisprudence—especially concerning crimi-
nal procedure questions.  For example, the Supreme Court has described 
constitutional criminal procedure as an assessment of the relevant bal-
ance between liberty and order.70  Because the aforementioned theorists 
believe that quantification of the protected interests such as privacy and 
liberty is almost impossible, they are especially skeptical of those who try 
to think about assessing a relevant balance between liberty and order for 
purposes of the Fourth Amendment, or the Fifth and Sixth Amend-
ments, through some measure of liberty and of order.71  They believe, 
moreover, that any attempt to quantify these interests and hold them 
commensurate with safety in a balancing analysis will inevitably fail to 
adequately protect the valued constitutional interest.  Laurence Tribe, 
for example, has argued, “in that kind of calculus, the costs will always 
seem weightier than the benefits.  The benefits will be elusive, intangible 
 
 67. See PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY AND BLAME: COMMUNITY 
VIEWS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1995). 
 68. See Dan M. Kahan, Lay Perceptions of Justice vs. Criminal Law Doctrine: A False Dichot-
omy?, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 793, 793 (2000); Christopher Slobogin, Is Justice Just Us?  Using Social 
Science to Inform Substantive Criminal Law,  87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 315 (1996) (book re-
view). 
 69. To be clear, I have no idea whether George P. Fletcher believes that particular study by Rob-
inson and Darley is irrelevant to criminal law.  My point is that one who thinks that defining criminal 
law is a humanistic enterprise is likely to conclude that the Code drafters need not attend much, if at 
all, to the predilections of the public on any issue and tough ones especially. 
 70. Kansas v. Hendrick, 521 U.S. 346 (1997). 
 71. Examples are numerous.  See, e.g., Morgan Cloud, Pragmatism, Positivism, and Principles in 
Fourth Amendment Theory, 41 UCLA L. REV. 199 (1993) (advocating formalism out of a concern that 
the Court’s pragmatic balancing systematically tilts against protection of individual interests); Stephen 
J. Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 435, 436–37 (1987) (analyzing the core hold-
ings of Miranda without reference to law enforcement interests); Charles D. Weisselberg, Saving 
Miranda, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 109, 121 (1988) (implying that the contours of the Fifth Amendment 
are to be determined absent a balancing of law enforcement interests). 
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and diffuse.”72  Thus, many in this camp reject cost-benefit analyses in 
criminal procedure and the empiricism that seems to accompany such 
analyses.73 
FIGURE 1 
A figure illustrates the intuition. 
 Notion of Rights  
 Instrumental Deontological 
Evidence   





This figure suggests that those who conceive of constitutional rights 
in instrumental terms ought to be very open to empiricism that is rele-
vant to those rights in order to determine their scope.  In keeping with 
this, Bernard Harcourt and I have advocated the use of more empiricism 
in constitutional criminal procedure cases in part because of the concep-
tion of a constitutional right in this area that we believe is appropriate: 
Defining the scope of a criminal procedural right as a process of de-
tecting the appropriate balance between societal interests in safety, 
on the one hand, and freedom from unnecessary government intru-
sions, on the other, envisions rights as flexible and contextual, as ac-
commodating of changes in political and social climate, and as po-
litical and instrumental.74 
On the other hand, eminent theorists such as Ronald Dworkin have re-
jected precisely this conception of a constitutional right.  Dworkin has 
quite famously called individual rights “political trumps” not subject to 
be balanced against numerous other interests and claims.75  Balancing 
analyses imply that relevant interests must be measured against one an-
 
 72. Laurence H. Tribe, Seven Deadly Sins of Straining the Constitution Through a Pseudo-
Scientific Sieve, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 155, 157 (1984). 
 73. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, “Close Enough for Government Work”: The Exclusionary 
Rule After Leon, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 309; Yale Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) the Exclusionary Rule 
Rest on a “Principled Basis” Rather Than an “Empirical Proposition”, 16 CREIGHTON L. REV. 565 
(1983). 
 74. Meares & Harcourt, supra note 13, at 744–45.  I want to emphasize here that Bernard Har-
court and I do not promote a purely instrumental approach to the articulation of rights in criminal 
procedure, as Transparent Adjudication and our separate work elsewhere make clear.  Our position 
acknowledges the validity of the spectrum of analyses from the upper left-hand box to the lower right-
hand box in Figure 1. 
 75. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY xi (1977).  The quote in full is:  “Indi-
vidual rights are political trumps held by individuals.  Individuals have rights when, for some reason, a 
collective goal is not a sufficient justification for denying them what they wish, as individuals, to have 
or to do, or not a sufficient justification for imposing some loss or injury upon them.”  Id. 
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other in some way.  This measurement process, in turn, suggests or even 
welcomes the possibility of empirical research.  The trump metaphor for 
rights rejects these comparisons and implies a reasoning about rights in 
ways that disavow the relevance of empirical evidence.76 
Figure 1 is not confined to reasoning about constitutional criminal 
procedure.  With respect to reasoning about the criminal law we can see 
how one who believes that the point of criminal law is to deter prohibited 
behavior should obviously welcome empirical evidence that justifies her 
choice of rules in instrumental terms.77  In contrast, a committed retribu-
tivist can assert the importance of charging and punishing a murderer 
even if that person is the last person living in a particular community so 
that the notion of deterrence, and empirical evidence relevant to deter-
rence, is completely irrelevant.78 
The task is to explain to those committed residents of the lower 
right-hand quadrant of my figure why they ought to welcome empiricism 
in criminal law and procedure decision making.  Their arguments do not 
make much room for this evidence, but I can offer an instrumental rea-
son why this group ought to be more supportive of empiricism in criminal 
justice decision making.  Empiricism will make criminal justice deci-
sions—constitutional criminal procedure decisions in particular—more 
transparent.  Adjudication that expressly and openly discusses the nor-
mative judgments at the core of constitutional criminal procedure is 
transparent.  Reference to relevant social science and empirical data cre-
ates transparency because these references ground factual assertions.  As 
a result, interpretive choices are more clearly reflected.  Increased atten-
tion to empirical evidence will not guarantee the right answers in crimi-
nal procedure cases, but use of empirical evidence will produce a clearer 
picture of the existing constitutional landscape and spotlight the norma-
tive judgments at the heart of criminal procedure cases.  Given that the 
court already has committed to a form of constitutional adjudication that 
is congenial to empiricism—balancing—foes of this form of determining 
constitutional rights ought to advocate empiricism in order to better hold 
the Court accountable and open to their criticism.79 
 
 76. See Ronald Dworkin, Social Sciences and Constitutional Rights—the Consequences of Uncer-
tainty, 6 J.L. & EDUC. 3, 4–5 (1977) (explaining the importance of interpretative judgments in constitu-
tional decision making in a way that distinguishes the relevance of social science from this enterprise). 
 77. Bentham has summarized the purpose of criminal punishment in utilitarian terms.  He says 
punishment ought not to be inflicted where punishment is (1) groundless (no mischief to prevent); 
(2) inefficacious (where it cannot prevent mischief); (3) too expensive (where mischief produced is 
greater than would otherwise be prevented); (4) where it is needless (where punishment is not neces-
sary to prevent mischief).  See JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF 
MORALS AND LEGISLATION 171 (1848). 
 78. I refer here to Kant’s famous example.  See IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 
1994–98 (W. Hastie trans., 1887). 
 79. For a more extensive treatment of how empiricism can promote greater transparency of 
Court decisions and greater accountability of the Court to critics, see Meares & Harcourt, supra note 
13, at 735. 
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For example, in United States v. Leon,80 the question was whether 
evidence obtained in a search of the defendant’s home by police officers, 
who relied on a search warrant that ultimately was found to be invalid, 
should be excluded.  The Court chose to resolve the question by “weigh-
ing the costs and benefits of preventing the use in the prosecution’s case 
in chief of inherently trustworthy tangible evidence.”81  The benefit of 
admitting such information is primarily that it brings to the court’s atten-
tion inherently trustworthy evidence that supports the conviction of a 
criminal offender.  Such convictions promote the maintenance of order.  
The costs, of course, are bound up in the reasons for having and enforc-
ing the exclusionary rule—preservation of the integrity of the judicial fo-
rum and deterrence of police misconduct.  The Leon Court emphasized 
the goal of deterring police misconduct, and ultimately ruled that the ex-
clusion of evidence in these cases would not advance that goal. 
In reaching its conclusion, the Court relied on social science studies.  
Justice White, writing for the majority, pointed to nascent research on 
the effect of the exclusionary rule on the disposition of felony arrests, 
and he noted that the operation of the exclusionary rule appeared to re-
sult in the nonprosecution or nonconviction of only a small percentage of 
individuals.  But he emphasized that, “the small percentages with which 
[the researchers] deal mask a large absolute number of felons who are 
released because the cases against them were based in part on illegal 
searches or seizures.”82  Justice White then concluded that the potential 
for large numbers of felons to go free militated against application of the 
exclusionary rule where there was no basis—and where the Court had 
been offered none—“for believing that exclusion of evidence . . . will 
have a significant deterring effect on the issuing judge or magistrate.”83  
Justices Brennan and Marshall in dissent emphasized concern for the in-
tegrity of the judicial forum as the primary reason to reject a good faith 
exception to the exclusionary rule.  The dissenters also pointed to em-
pirical evidence—the same studies relied upon by the majority84—to ar-
gue that the costs of the exclusionary rule were “quite low.”85  By point-
 
 80. 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 
 81. Id. at 907. 
 82. Id. at 908 n.6. 
 83. Id. at 916. 
 84. Both the majority and dissent relied upon FLOYD F. FEENEY ET AL., NATIONAL INSTITUTE 
OF JUSTICE ARRESTS WITHOUT CONVICTIONS: HOW OFTEN THEY OCCUR AND WHY (1983); NAT’L 
INST. OF JUSTICE, THE EFFECTS OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE: A STUDY IN CALIFORNIA (1982); U.S. 
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES: 
IMPACT OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE ON FEDERAL CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS (1979); Thomas Y. 
Davies, A Hard Look at What We Know (and Still Need to Learn) About the “Costs” of the Exclusion-
ary Rule: The NIJ Study and Other Studies of “Lost” Arrests, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 611; Peter F. 
Nardulli, The Societal Cost of the Exclusionary Rule: An Empirical Assessment, 1983 A.B.F. RES. J. 
585. 
 85. Leon, 468 U.S. at 950.  “Contrary to the claims of the rule’s critics that exclusion leads to ‘the 
release of countless guilty criminals,’ these studies have demonstrated that federal and state prosecu-
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ing to evidence suggesting that the costs of the exclusionary rule were 
quite low, the dissenters were in a better position to highlight the impor-
tance of their preferred justification for the rule—preservation of the ju-
dicial forum—which is a rationale that does not depend on the effective-
ness of the exclusionary rule as a deterrent to unconstitutional law 
enforcement conduct. 
I raise Leon as an example, without offering my views of whether 
the majority or the dissent made the stronger case.  My goal in this essay 
is to demonstrate that the use of empiricism will not inevitably favor one 
conclusion over another or one ideological predisposition over another.  
What is important to attend to is the form of the Court’s inquiry in Leon 
and its ready acceptance of relevant “social authority” to inform and 
guide its balancing analysis. 
While it is perhaps easiest to see the relevance of empiricism as a 
strategy of critique in criminal procedure, it is important to see that this 
research is also relevant in the criminal law area.  The notion of provoca-
tion is one of the mechanisms used in the criminal law to perform the 
hard work of grading the level of the defendant’s culpability in a homi-
cide case.  This key concept provides a particularly poignant example of 
how empiricism can be used for critical purposes.  English scholar Jona-
than Herring has pointed out that there are three instances in which a de-
fendant’s characteristics could be considered in determining whether, as 
a legal matter, provocation is present to mitigate the defendant’s pun-
ishment for a homicide:  (1) “whether the defendant was provoked to 
lose self control”; (2) to determine “the gravity of the provocation to the 
reasonable person”; and (3) to assess the level of self control to be ex-
pected of a reasonable person.86  Empirical research is obviously key to 
thinking about the first two stages of the provocation inquiry.  Large 
scale, generalizable, statistical research seems an especially nice fit with 
the analysis at stage two.  Yet, in moving from stage two to the normative 
question embodied in stage three, one must ask whether evidence indi-
cating that a defendant’s inability to exercise self control in a particular 
situation is normal, in other words, typical, and whether it  necessarily 
means that the defendant should receive a mitigated sentence.  The 
drafters of the ALI’s Model Penal Code decided, for the most part, that 
the answer to this question is yes. 
The Model Penal Code provides for mitigation of murder to man-
slaughter when the defendant has committed a homicide under “the in-
fluence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is a 
reasonable explanation or excuse.”87  This definition in and of itself does 
not necessarily mean that empirical research about behavioral norms is 
 
tors very rarely drop cases because of potential search and seizure problems.”  Id. (citations omitted) 
The dissenters go on to point out the extremely small percentages mentioned by the majority.  Id. 
 86. Jonathan Herring, Provocation and Ethnicity, 1996 CRIM. L. REV. 490, 490.  
 87. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3 (1980). 
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the key to assessing the defendant’s culpability.  Reasonableness can be 
determined in a less behaviorist manner.88  It is nonetheless clear that the 
Model Penal Code drafters intended for the manslaughter provision to 
emphasize an excuse-based approach centered on assessing the defen-
dant’s lack of self control.89  Under the Code, typicality of behavior—the 
likelihood that most people would become inflamed if they stood in the 
defendant’s shoes—supports a finding of excuse from liability.  While a 
determination of typicality clearly can be empirically tested, the theory 
that underlies this notion of provocation is not based upon any hypothe-
sis about human behavior.90  Instead the promoters of the Model Penal 
Code’s excuse-based approach to provocation simply relied upon 
“‘common-sense generalizations’ about ‘human nature.’”91 
While the Model Penal Code offers a mechanistic conception of 
provocation, one can also think about this problem in purely formal 
terms—this was the common-law approach.92  At the other end of the 
spectrum from a notion of provocation grounded in purely formal terms 
is the idea that provocation is inimical to the purest aims of equal treat-
ment in criminal law because of the heat-of-passion partial defense inevi-
tably leads to unequal treatment of men and women.93  There are many 
positions between these two poles.  Importantly, these between-pole per-
spectives, as well as the poles themselves, depend a great deal on empiri-
cal realities of behavior.  Certainly if a standard is designed in a way that 
claims to conform to “normal” behavior, as the Model Penal Code does, 
then decision makers ought to be open and eager to learn whether the 
behavioral assumptions of the standard are true.  If a theory does not de-
pend so much on what people actually do, but instead on what we believe 
that people ought to aspire to do, then empirical evidence should make 
the aspirational exclamation that much more clear.  And, as was the case 
 
 88. See Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 
96 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 306–12, 373–74 (1996) (advocating an assessment of provocation that depends 
upon evaluating whether the defendant’s angry response is morally appropriate rather than determin-
ing simply whether the defendant lost control as a mechanistic matter). 
 89. See Joshua Dressler, When “Heterosexual” Men Kill “Homosexual” Men: Reflections on 
Provocation Law, Sexual Advances, and the “Reasonable Man” Standard, 85 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 726, 746 & n.107 (1995) (concluding that the Model Penal Code takes a decidedly ex-
cuse-based approach to manslaughter mitigation); Victoria Nourse, Passion’s Progress: Modern Law 
Reform and the Provocation Defense, 106 YALE L.J. 1331, 1339 (1997) [hereinafter Nourse, Passion’s 
Progress] (discussing the centrality of the self-control theory to the notion of the partial excuse that 
underlies manslaughter). 
 90. See Nourse, Passion’s Progress, supra note 89, at 1369. 
 91. Id. 
 92. The “nineteenth century four” categorize adequate provocation as a legal matter.  The four 
categories are:  adultery, mutual combat, false arrest, and violent assault.  See Donna Coker, Heat of 
Passion and Wife Killing: Men Who Batter/Men Who Kill, 2 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 71, 80 
(1992) (discussing the “nineteenth century four”). 
 93. See, e.g., Susan Estrich, Don’t Be Surprised If O.J. Gets Off Easy, USA TODAY, June 23, 
1994, at A11 (claiming that it may have once been reasonable not to expect men to control their be-
havior, but “it isn’t reasonable anymore”); Nourse, Passion’s Progress, supra note 89, at 1339 (criticiz-
ing the defense, but stopping short of abolition). 
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with constitutional adjudication in this area, to the extent that there are 
disagreements between behaviorists and those who take a more philoso-
phical approach, those disagreements will be more transparently high-
lighted in legal decision making against the background of empirical in-
formation. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
While it is difficult to disagree with the conclusion that empiricism is 
valuable to assess the consequences of criminal law and procedural rules, 
I have sought to demonstrate here that empiricism is also relevant to the 
normative choices we make regarding these rules.  It turns out that many 
of the objections typically lodged against more empiricism in criminal 
justice decision making are themselves empirically contingent.  More-
over, the primary objection that declares empiricism irrelevant to the en-
terprise of articulating criminal law and procedure still leaves room for 
such research. 
As I close, I want to make clear that I do not believe that choices 
about criminal law and procedure can be made in any value-free way—
quite the contrary.  Nothing about my advocacy of the greater use of em-
piricism suggests that more empiricism will make it easier to make hard 
choices.  In answering the third objection in this essay, I intended to 
show that even those who believe that the choices we make are wholly 
deontological should welcome empiricism in the criminal law and proce-
dure realm because it is my belief that courts, litigants, and political ac-
tors who often pursue a more consequentialist path can be better criti-
cized and held to account for their decisions by their more purely 
“normative” colleagues if the consequentialists are forced to document 
their arguments in empirical terms.  This is an argument that even moral 
philosophers should welcome. 
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